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Abstract
The present paper aims to quantify the macroeconomic and welfare eﬀects of tax-
favored retirement accounts. Starting from an equilibrium without saving incentives,
we introduce such accounts and compute the new transition path and the resulting
long-run equilibrium. Since our overlapping-generations model comprises a detailed
progressive tax system, borrowing constraints as well as stochastic income risk, we
can compare macroeconomic and liquidity eﬀects, tax distortions and the insurance
properties of the policy reform.
Our simulations indicate that tax-favored retirement accounts as implemented
in many OECD countries will have a signiﬁcant impact on capital accumulation and
wage growth in the long run, but only yield insigniﬁcant aggregate eﬃciency changes.
While elderly generations are typically hurt by such a reform, young and future
generations beneﬁt. Finally, with respect to the intragenerational redistribution, a
subsidy system that includes direct bonus payments might be preferred to a system
with pure tax deductions.
JEL Classiﬁcation: H55, J26
Keywords: Savings incentives, stochastic general equilibrium model
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Like many other countries in the past, Germany has recently introduced individual re-
tirement accounts (IRAs, popularly referred to as “Riester accounts” after the former
labor minister Walter Riester) in order to compensate individuals for the future decline
in public pensions. Income that is saved in these accounts is given a tax relief, the accu-
mulation during the saving phase is tax exempt and qualiﬁed withdrawals are taxed as
normal income.
In principle, German IRAs work similar as the respective accounts in the US or in Britain,
but there are also some important diﬀerences with respect to the government regulation
and the provided saving incentives1. Since the incentives are especially designed for low
income households, they can take two forms: direct bonus payments which depend on the
household characteristics (number of children, non-entitled partners) and tax deductions
as special expenses. While the former are usually more advantageous for low income
households, the latter will be chosen by higher income earners. In order to qualify for the
maximum bonus payment, the beneﬁciary must invest a speciﬁed percentage of his gross
earnings, otherwise the transfer payment is reduced accordingly. With respect to the tax
deductions there exists an annual contribution ceiling which will be ﬁnally ﬁxed at 2.100
e and in the case of early withdrawal (i.e. before age 60) the accumulated previous tax
savings and government subsidies have to be reimbursed to the tax authorities. Finally,
approved payment plans must provide a life annuity after retirement.
The present paper aims to provide a comprehensive economic assessment of such savings
subsidies. Since in Germany the take-up rate for IRAs was quite disappointing initially
and only increased recently, it is important to isolate the policy instruments which are
successful in boosting private savings. But the amount of contributions to IRAs alone is
only a weak indicator for the policy eﬀectiveness. With respect to the savings performance
it is crucial whether contributions are funded from additional savings or diverted from
other saving. In order to evaluate the distributional impact, it is important to know how
the tax incentives beneﬁt workers from diﬀerent income levels and cohorts. It is also
necessary to quantify the current and future budgetary implications in order to assess
the implied tax distortions. Finally, in an uncertain environment we need to know how
the reform alters the risk allocation across and within generations in order to judge its
insurance eﬀects.
While tax-favored retirement accounts were already introduced two decades ago in the US,
1A more detailed description of the German IRAs and a comparison of tax-favored retirement saving
plans in OECD countries can be found in OECD (2005).
1there is still an ongoing discussion about their economic performance. At least partly this
controversy is due to the limited data availability and the problems with the econometric
speciﬁcation, see Bernheim (2002) for a survey and discussion of this literature. For this
reason we simulate the introduction of tax-favored retirement accounts with a numerical
simulation model. This approach allows to isolate and compare the resulting individual
reactions and macroeconomic consequences as well as to evaluate the welfare and eﬃciency
implications of such reforms.
Already Engen et al. (1994) have examined the eﬀectiveness of individual retirement
accounts in the US. Applying a partial equilibrium life-cycle model, they compute the op-
timal individual saving behavior for alternative contribution limits and withdrawal rates.
Their simulations indicate that individuals will mainly substitute from liquid savings in
the short run and increase their aggregate savings only slightly in the long run. The
present study applies a general equilibrium model which was pioneered by Auerbach and
Kotlikoﬀ (1987) and has been recently extended to include idiosyncratic income risk2.
˙ Imrohoro˘ glu et al. (1998) evaluate in this framework the long-run consequences of IRAs
on the US capital stock for various contribution limits and tax savings instruments. They
conclude that about 9 percent of IRA contributions during the 80ies constituted additional
savings which raised the US capital stock by about 6 percent.
While ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu et al. (1998) do not provide a welfare analysis, applications such as
Huang et al. (1997), De Nardi et al. (1999) or Conesa and Krueger (1999) evaluate
the long run eﬀects and the transition path when the current US pension system is ei-
ther replaced by a two-tier system of personal saving accounts or completely eliminated.
While these studies are able to compare the intergenerational welfare consequences of the
considered reforms, they did not compute the aggregate eﬃciency gains or losses, which
is required for an an overall assessment. Consequently, our study follows Nishiyama and
Smetters (2005) as well as Fehr and Habermann (2005) who isolate the insurance and
distortionary eﬀects of the considered policy reforms by compensating agents along the
transition path with lump-sum transfers or taxes. Compared to the original study of
˙ Imrohoro˘ glu et al. (1998), our approach also includes a richer structure of individual
preferences as well as a progressive tax and subsidy system.
We ﬁnd that a reform with unlimited tax deductions where the tax shortfalls are ﬁnanced
by consumption taxes and public debt yields the strongest growth eﬀects and aggregate
eﬃciency gains while the implied welfare losses for middle-aged current generations are
only modest. However, such a reform is politically not feasible, since public debt rises
2For a recent survey of this literature, see De Nardi et al. (2001).
2dramatically. Consequently, tax-favored accounts in OECD countries are combined with
limited saving subsidies in order to dampen the initial shortfalls in tax revenues. Our
simulations indicate that such reforms still have a signiﬁcant impact on capital accumu-
lation in the long run. Depending on the applied policy mix, the latter will rise between
3.5 and 9.6 percent while between 11 and 14 percent of IRA contributions are additional
savings. Despite the positive eﬀects on capital accumulation, the aggregate eﬃciency
gain is almost insigniﬁcant for most realistic parameter combinations. This is due to the
fact that lower tax distortions have to be weighted against the reduced insurance proper-
ties of the tax system. With respect to the distributional consequences we ﬁnd that the
reform will reduce the welfare of elderly generations and increase the welfare of future
generations by roughly 1 percent of their respective remaining lifetime resources. Finally,
with respect to the speciﬁc saving incentives our simulations indicate that a mixture of
tax deductions and bonuses as applied in Germany may be preferred due to the positive
growth, distributional and eﬃciency consequences.
In the next section, we describe how we model the tax and beneﬁt system and sketch
the structure of the simulation model. Section 3 explains the calibration and simulation
approach. Finally, section 4 presents the simulation results and section 5 oﬀers some
concluding remarks.
2 The model economy
2.1 Preliminaries
We consider an economy populated by overlapping generations of individuals which face
random survival up to a maximum possible lifespan of J = 16 periods, i.e. each model
period covers ﬁve years. In addition to lifespan uncertainty, individuals also face pro-
ductivity shocks during their working time. Labor supply is variable, but consumers are
forced to retire at the retirement age jR = 9 (i.e. real age 60). During retirement, pen-
sioners receive payroll-ﬁnanced social security beneﬁts and run down their accumulated
assets. Apart from the pension system, the government levies a progressive personal tax
on income from labor, capital and pensions as well as proportional taxes on consumption
and corporate proﬁts. Tax revenues are used to ﬁnance public goods and the interest
payments on public debt. The production sector comprises a constant returns to scale
Cobb-Douglas production function without technological progress and no aggregate un-
certainty.
The initial equilibrium of our model economy is a steady state. Then the policy reform is
3implemented before the individual productivity of the next period is revealed, and a new
equilibrium path in the closed economy is calculated. We assume zero population growth
and keep the survival probabilities constant at initial values. Consequently, all agents face
a probability sj of surviving up to age j, conditional of surviving up to age j − 1. Every
age j cohort Nj is fragmented into subgroups ξ(zj)Nj where
 
zj ξ(zj) = 1 reﬂecting their
state zj at a speciﬁc age j. The state zj =( j,epj,aR
j ,aj,e j) of an age j agent describes
the agent’s earning points for public pension claims epj, tax-favored assets aR
j ,o r d i n a r y
asset holdings aj, and individual productivity ej. In the following, we concentrate on the
long run equilibrium and omit the state index zj for every variable whenever possible.
Agents are then only distinguished according to their age j.
2.2 The individual decision problem
Our model assumes a preference structure that is represented by a time-separable, nested
CES utility function. In order to isolate risk aversion from intertemporal substitution, we
follow the approach of Epstein and Zin (1991) and formulate the maximization problem
of a representative consumer at age j and state zj recursively as




























where  j and cj denote leisure and consumption at age j respectively and the parameter
θ represents the rate of time preference. Since lifespan is uncertain, the expected utility
in future periods is weighted with the survival probability sj+1. Productivity ej at each
age j is uncertain and depends on the productivity in the previous period. Consequently,
π(ej+1|ej) denotes the probability to experience productivity ej+1 in the next period if
the current productivity is ej. The parameters γ and η deﬁne the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution between consumption and leisure in diﬀerent years and the degree of
(relative) risk aversion, respectively. Note that for the special case η = 1
γ we are back at
the traditional expected utility speciﬁcation, see Epstein and Zin (1991, 266). The period











where ρ denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and
leisure at each age j. Finally, the leisure preference parameter α is assumed to be age
4independent. The budget constraint is deﬁned as follows:




j ) − (1 + τ
c)cj + bj (3)
with a1 = aJ+1 =0a n daj ≥ 0 ∀ j. In addition to interest income from savings raj,
households receive gross labor income wj =( 1 − j)we j during their working period as well
as public pensions pj during retirement. They contribute to or withdraw from tax-favored
accounts sR
j and have to pay progressive income taxes T(yj,s R
j ) which depend on taxable
gross income yj and changes in tax-favored accounts. Due to a contribution ceiling the
average contribution rate for public pensions τj depends on income. Finally, the price of
consumption goods includes consumption taxes τc and bj deﬁnes the accidental bequests
received at age j.
Our model abstracts from annuity markets3. Consequently, private assets of all agents
who died are aggregated and then distributed among all cohorts following an exogenous








j (zj)(1 − τ
b)]ξ(zj)(1 − sj)Nj−1 (4)
where k ∈{ u,p}. The age distribution of bequest is computed in the initial steady
state where we assume that the heirs always receive the assets of the generation which
was 25 years older. Within a generation we distinguish a uniform distribution Γu(j,ej)
across diﬀerent productivity types and a distribution Γp(j,ej) which is proportional to
the current productivity level ej. Inheritances from tax-favored accounts might be due to
a speciﬁc inheritance tax τb.
Assets aR











J+1 =0 . (5)
In principle, assets could be withdrawn from the accounts before retirement (i.e. sR
j <
0,j < j R). However, preliminary withdrawal might be due to a penalty, which reduces
the liquidity of tax-favored accounts compared to ordinary assets signiﬁcantly.
In our model we assume that contributions to public pensions are exempted from tax while
the beneﬁts are fully taxed. Consequently, taxable gross income yj in (3) is computed
from gross labor income net of pension contributions, capital income (net of a saving
allowance ds) and (after retirement) public pensions net of a ﬁxed work related allowance
d:
yj = wj(1 − τj)+m a x [ a jr − d
s;0]+pj − d. (6)
3This is an important deviation from Riester accounts in Germany.
5Tax payments T(yj,s R
j ) depend on gross tax payments T05(yj) net of saving subsidies.
The latter consist of the tax savings from contributions to tax-favored accounts or (for







T05(yj) − max[T05(yj) − T05(yj − min[sR
j , ˆ s]);Zulj]i f sR
j ≥ 0,
T05(yj − [1 − φ]sR
j ) − φsR
j if sR
j < 0,j<j R,
T05(yj − sR
j )i f sR
j < 0,j≥ jR.
(7)
As already explained, contributions to tax-favored accounts could only be deducted up
to a limit which amounts to ˆ s. Early withdrawals from tax-favored accounts might be
subject to a penalty which amounts to φ percent of the withdrawal. The remaining fraction
has to be fully taxed. According to (7) tax savings depend on individual contributions
to tax-favored accounts sR
j and the marginal tax rate. For low income households the
direct bonus payment might be higher. The latter is deﬁned as a a hump-shaped age-
dependent transfer scheme trj over the household life-cycle which is computed based on
the ﬁnal German bonus scheme4. Full bonus payments are only received if savings exceed
aﬁ x e ds h a r eκ of individual gross labor income wj. In order to omit that bonuses exceed
savings in tax-favored accounts, we restrict the maximum bonus payment to 95 percent of











j ]i f 0 ≤ sR
j <κ w j.
(8)
2.3 The production side
The economy is populated by a large number of competitive ﬁrms, the sum of which we
normalize to unity. Aggregate output Y is produced using a Cobb-Douglas production
technology, i.e.
Y =  K
εL
1−ε (9)
where K and L are aggregate capital and labor, ε is capital’s share in production, and  
is a technology parameter. Firms have to pay corporate taxes T k = τk 
Y − wL − δK
 
where the corporate tax rate τk of 15 percent is applied to the output net of labor costs
wL and depreciation δK.
4In and after 2008 a household will receive 185 e per child and 154 e per adult person.
5In Germany the government has speciﬁed speciﬁc minimum saving amounts which depend on the
family structure.
6Firms will employ labor up to the point where the marginal product of labor equals labor
costs. Similarly they will employ capital up to the point where the net marginal product
of capital is equal to the interest rate:


















In each period the government issues new debt ΔB and collects taxes and social security
contributions from households and ﬁrms in order to ﬁnance general government expendi-













With respect to public debt, we assume initially that the government maintains an ex-
ogenously ﬁxed debt to output ratio. General government expenditures G consist of gov-
ernment purchases of goods and services which are ﬁxed per capita. In order to balance
the budget we adjust the consumption tax rate τc.
In each year, the pension system pays old-age beneﬁts and collects payroll contributions
from wage income below the contribution ceiling which is ﬁxed at two times the average
income ¯ w. Individual pension beneﬁts pj of a retiree of age j ≥ jR in a speciﬁc year
are computed from the product of his earning points epjR the retiree has accumulated at
retirement and the actual pension amount (APA) of the respective year:
pj = epjR × APA. (13)
The accumulated earning points depend on the relative income position min[wj/¯ w;2]of
the worker at working age j<j R. Since the contribution ceiling is ﬁxed at the double
of average income, the maximum earning points that could be collected per year are 2.
Accumulated earning points at age j are therefore
epj = epj−1 +m i n [ wj/¯ w;2]. (14)
The budget of the pension system must be balanced in each period. Therefore, the general










min[w(zj);2 ¯ w]ξ(zj)Nj. (15)
7The right hand side of equation (15) shows the individual contribution base. Households
don’t pay contribution on income above the contribution ceiling. Note that the general
social security contribution rate τ which is calculated from (15) is not necessarily identical
with the individual contribution rates in the budget constraint (3). The latter is given by
τj =
 
τ if wj ≤ 2¯ w,
τ2¯ w/wj if wj > 2¯ w.
(16)
3 Calibration
In order to solve the model we have to specify the income process, preference and techno-
logy parameters and tax rates. This section presents our parameter choices and describes
the initial equilibrium.6
3.1 The income process
We consider six productivity proﬁles across the life cycle. The four top proﬁles are directly
taken from Fehr (1999) while the lowest proﬁle from the previous study has been split up
in order to improve the income distribution. When an agent enters the labor market (at
age 20-24) he belongs to the lowest productivity level with a probability of 10 percent, to
the second lowest again with 10 percent and to higher levels with 20 percent, respectively.
After the initial period, agents change their productivity levels according to the following
Markov transition matrix.
Table 1: Markov transition matrix
Current productivity level
123456
1 0.40 0.24 0.17 0.09 0.05 0.04
2 0.17 0.35 0.33 0.09 0.04 0.02
Past 3 0.08 0.13 0.41 0.24 0.10 0.04
productivity 4 0.06 0.03 0.19 0.39 0.25 0.08
level 5 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.22 0.41 0.22
6 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.20 0.63
Source: Authors’ own calculations from 1998/2003
SOEP data
6This section as well as subsection 4.1 follows closely Fehr and Habermann (2005).
8The Markov transition matrix is calculated as follows: First the primary earners in each
household of the 1998 survey are ranked according to their gross income and then divided
into six income classes. Then we rank and compute the respective income class of those
persons who are still in the survey in 2003. Finally we calculate the above reported
transition probabilities for each income class.
3.2 Preferences, technology, demographics and bequest
Table 2 reports the other important parameter values. Except the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion, all preference and technology parameters are taken from Auerbach and
Kotlikoﬀ (1987, 52f.) as well as Fehr (1999, 57). Values between 1 and 5 for η are
typically perceived as reasonable in the literature, see Cecchetti et al. (2000, 792) for a
discussion. The technology level is chosen in order to normalize labor income.
Table 2: Parameter values of the model
Symbol Value
Utility function
time preference rate (p.a.) θ 0.01
intertemporal elasticity of substitution γ 0.5
intratemporal elasticity of substitution ρ 0.6
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion η 4.0
leisure preference parameter α 1.5
Production function
technology level   1.48
capital share in production ε 0.30
economic depreciation (p.a.) δ 0.05
Policy parameters
corporate tax rate τk 15.0
debt (in % of GDP) B/Y 60.0
age of retirement (model age jR = 9) 60-64
replacement rate ((jR − 1) × APA/ ¯ wn)0 . 6
The actual pension amount (APA) in equation (13) is computed in order to yield a
standard pension (i.e. where epjR = jR−1) which amounts to sixty percent of net average
earnings ¯ wn.
The taxation of gross income (from labor, capital and pensions) is close to the current
German income tax code and the marginal tax rate schedule introduced in 2005. Conse-
quently, after the basic allowance of 7800 e the marginal tax rate rises linearly from 15
9to maximum of 42 percent when taxable income y passes 52.000 e. We assume that our
individuals are married couples with a sole wage earner and apply the German income
splitting method. For capital income there is a special allowance of ds = 1800 e (per
couple)7.
Finally, with respect to the demographic parameters we compute average survival proba-
bilities from Bomsdorf (2003) for the ages 20 to 99 as shown in Table A.1 in the appendix
as well as the intergenerational bequest distribution.
3.3 Initial equilibrium
Table 3 reports the structure of the models initial equilibrium without tax-favored accounts
and compares it with the respective ﬁgures in 2004 for Germany. All in all, the model
represents the basic economic and ﬁscal structure of Germany quite well. Since the model
is simulated as a closed economy, the interest rate is endogenous and the trade balance is
zero. The key characteristics of the tax and pension system match the current German
situation.
We have assumed in the benchmark equilibrium that inheritances are distributed uni-
formly within a generation (i.e. Γu). If we distribute inheritances proportional to the
individual productivity, the inequality of the wealth distribution increases as well as ag-
gregate savings. Consequently, the capital-output ratio is slightly higher at 3.3 while the
interest rate slightly decreases to 2.7 percent. The structure of the tax and beneﬁt system,
however, is hardly aﬀected by the distribution of inheritances.
Table 4 shows the distribution for net income and assets respectively. The percentage
share of income (assets) is the share that accrues to subgroups of the population ranked
by net income (assets). Our initial equilibrium replicates the German income distribu-
tion quite well, however, as usual, it underestimates the wealth inequality8.A s a l r e a d y
noted above, the proportional distribution of inheritances deteriorates the wealth distri-
bution in the model. However, since rich (poor) households work less (more), the income
distribution becomes more equal.
Finally, 10 percent of labor market entrants (i.e. the lowest income class) would like to
borrow on the capital market in the initial equilibrium. For the following generations this
fraction falls to 9, 7, 5 and 2 percent, respectively.
This should suﬃce to explain our calibration and initial equilibrium. Next we turn to the
7In Germany this allowance is currently 3000 e for nominal interest income, but in our model we
have no inﬂation and therefore we reduce this amount by about 40 percent.
8Heer and Trede (2003, 96) point out that this might be due to the neglected business ownership.
10Table 3: The initial equilibrium
Model Germany
2004∗
Expenditures on GDP (% of GDP)
private consumption 63.8 59.1
government purchases 18.0 18.7
gross investment 18.2 17.3
exports-imports – 4.9
Government indicators
aggregate pension beneﬁts (% of GDP) 13.1 12.2
pension contribution rate (in %) 19.5 19.5
tax revenues (in % of GDP) 19.9 20.0
income tax 7.3 6.7
consumption tax 10.8 10.5
corporation tax 1.8 1.8
consumption tax rate (in %) 17.0 –
interest rate p.a. (in %) 3.0 –
bequest (in % of GDP) 5.1 5.2a
capital-output ratio 3.2 3.0
*Source: Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (2005).
a Braun et al. (2002) for the year 2002.
Table 4: Income and wealth distribution
Percentage share of income/assets Gini
Lowest 10% Highest 10% index
Γu Γp Γu Γp Γu Γp
net income 3.2 3.2 22.7 22.4 0.293 0.290 Model
assets 0.0 0.0 32.7 33.3 0.546 0.552
net income 3.1 23.9 0.299 Germany∗
assets 0.2 44.2 0.613
* Source: DIW (2005, 202)
policy reforms and their risk and eﬃciency implications.
114 Simulation results
This section compares the macroeconomic and welfare consequences of the introduction
of tax-favored accounts. Before the numerical results of the simulations are presented, we
ﬁrst explain the computation of the welfare changes.
4.1 Experimental design and social welfare
The welfare criterion we use to assess this reform is ex-ante expected utility of an agent,
before the productivity level is revealed (i.e. looking upon her life behind the Rawlsian veil











where π1 = π2 =0 .1a n dπ3 = ··· = π6 =0 .2. From that point of view one has some
desire for redistribution, which provides insurance for being born as a low-productivity
type. Following Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987, 87) we compute the proportional increase
in consumption and leisure (W) which would make an agent in the baseline scenario as
well oﬀ as in the reform scenario. If the expected utility level after the reform is ˆ V and
the expected utility level on the baseline path is ¯ V , the necessary increase (decrease) in









Consequently, a value of W =1 .0 indicates that this agent would need one percent more
resources in the baseline scenario to attain expected utility ˆ V .
In order to asses the aggregate eﬃciency consequences, we introduce a Lump-Sum Redis-
tribution Authority (LSRA) in the spirit of Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987, 65f.) as well
as Nishiyama and Smetters (2005) or Fehr and Habermann (2005). The LSRA pays a
lump-sum transfer (or levies a lump-sum tax) to each living household in the ﬁrst pe-
riod of the transition to bring their expected utility level back to the level of the initial
equilibrium. Since utility depends on age and state, these transfers (or taxes) have to
be computed for every agent in period one. Note that transfers diﬀer only between the
states of the earning points epj and asset holdings aj and aR
j but not between eﬃciencies
for agents with the same epj, aj and aR
j . That is because the reform is announced before
the productivity shock in period 1 is revealed. Consequently, age-j agents who already
worked before the reform are compensated by the transfers v1(zj, ¯ V (zj)), which guaranties
12for each individual at state zj the initial expected utility level ¯ V (zj). On the other hand,
those who enter the labor market in period t of the transition receive a transfer v1t(V ∗)
which guaranties them an expected utility level V ∗. Note that the transfers v1t may diﬀer
among future cohorts but the expected utility level V ∗ is identical for all. The value of














∗)N1 =0 . (18)
With V ∗ > ¯ V (i.e. W>0), all households in period one who have lived in the previous
period would be as well oﬀ as before the reform and all current and future newborn
households would be strictly better oﬀ. Hence, the new policy is Pareto improving after
lump-sum redistributions. With V ∗ < ¯ V (i.e. W<0), the policy reform is Pareto inferior
after lump-sum redistributions. In order to asses the overall eﬃciency of the reform we
will report the value of W after compensation in the following tables.
4.2 The benchmark reform experiment
In order to ﬁx the economic intuition, we apply our model ﬁrst to a stylized reform
experiment which has been never implemented in practice. In this benchmark simulation
we assume that it is possible to subtract an unlimited amount from the income tax and
save it in the tax-favored accounts (i.e. ˆ s = ∞). There are no bonus payments (i.e.
κ = ∞) and no penalties for early withdrawal (i.e. φ =0 .0). In order to guarantee a
complete taxation at the time of withdrawal we assume that the speciﬁc inheritance tax
rate is equal to the aggregate marginal income tax rate (i.e. τb =0 .17). Table 5 reports
the macroeconomic consequences of this benchmark reform.
Since current assets are equal to savings from the previous period, the capital stock is ﬁxed
in the reform period and we report the changes of the second period in the ﬁrst line of
Table 5. Right after the introduction of tax-favored accounts households shift their liquid
assets and additional savings into these accounts in order to balance marginal tax rates
over the life cycle and reduce their tax burden. Since many elderly and poor individuals
have no incentive to accumulate in the new accounts and rich households will only balance
their marginal tax rates, the initial share of IRAs in total assets only amounts to slightly
more than one third. About ( 6
1.06×34 =) 16.6 percent of IRAs consist of new savings, the
rest is diverted from the already existing ordinary savings accounts. The IRA savings
decrease aggregate income tax revenues as well as private consumption. Consequently, in
order to balance the budget the consumption tax rate has to increase by 9.8 percentage
points initially. Labor supply and employment increases due to the reduced marginal tax
13Table 5: Macroeconomic eﬀects of tax-favored accounts in the benchmark∗
Period 2005-09 2015-19 2025-29 2035-39 2045-49 ∞
Capital stock 6.0a 10.6 16.5 19.4 20.8 21.9
IRA shareb 34a 59 83 93 95 96
Employment 2.8 1.3 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5
Consumption -2.8 -0.1 2.0 3.1 3.5 3.9
GDP 2.0 4.0 5.4 6.0 6.3 6.5
Wage -0.8 2.7 4.4 5.2 5.6 6.0
Interest rate p.a.c 0.1 -0.4 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9
Bequest 1.3a 2.3 6.2 9.9 11.3 12.2
Consumption taxc 9.8 4.7 1.4 -0.3 -0.9 -1.1
∗Changes are reported in percentage over initial equilibrium.
aPeriod 2010-2014. bIn percent of aggregate assets. cChanges in percentage points.
burden on labor income, while wages have to decrease slightly in order to balance the
labor market.
During the transition, the rising capital stock increases bequests and induces higher wages
while the interest rate falls slightly. Consequently, aggregate consumption rises and con-
sumption tax rates decrease even below the original level. In the long run, the aggregate
capital stock increases by almost 22 percentage points and the consumption tax rate is
reduced by more than one percentage point. The share of tax-favored assets in total
assets (IRA share) increases steadily since younger households tend to save heavily in the
new accounts. On ﬁrst sight it might be surprising that in the long run not all savings
are accumulated in the tax-favored accounts. However, those individuals who expect a
high tax rate in retirement but face a lower marginal tax rate while working will save
predominantly in ordinary accounts. In addition, poor households might be indiﬀerent
since their asset returns are below the speciﬁc savings allowance.
Next we consider the welfare changes for speciﬁc cohorts computed from equation (17) as
well as the aggregate eﬃciency consequences of the benchmark reform in Figure 19.N o t
surprisingly, the initial consumption tax increase especially hurts the elderly households,
since they don’t beneﬁt from the income tax deductions. The welfare losses for the oldest
generations amounts to more than four percent of their remaining resources. Welfare losses
decrease with falling age since younger households can take advantage of tax deductions,
experience higher wages and face lower consumption taxes. Those who enter the labor
9Note that we report the average welfare change for each cohort since we have to distinguish agents
living in the reform year according to their current state.
14market in the reform period (i.e. year of birth is 1985) still face a welfare loss due to the
reform, but younger generations will gain up to 2.5 percent of their resources.
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Figure 1 also shows that the considered benchmark reform would yield a slight Pareto-
improvement. If all current households are compensated by LSRA transfers as described
above, young and future households could still experience a welfare increase which amounts
to 0.22 percent of initial resources. The aggregate eﬃciency gain is due to the induced
changes in tax distortions and insurance properties of the tax system. As Nishiyama and
Smetters (2005) have already shown, a reform towards consumption taxation will reduce
tax distortions but also deteriorate the insurance properties of the tax system. In order to
improve the economic intuition, Table 6 reports some sensitivity calculations for the ag-
gregate eﬃciency eﬀects of the considered benchmark reform. If we eliminate the taxation
of inheritances, the aggregate eﬃciency gain increases from 0.22 percent to 0.37 percent.
On ﬁrst sight this is counterintuitive since the inheritance tax is a lump-sum tax so that
its elimination increases tax distortions. However, uniformly distributed bequests serve
as a insurance device against income shocks. Consequently, the elimination of inheritance
taxes improves the insurance properties which in turn dominates the increased tax dis-
tortions. When bequests are distributed proportionally, they can’t serve as an insurance
device. Consequently, since the positive insurance eﬀects from the higher bequests are
missing in the left column, the reform yields an aggregate eﬃciency loss. If inheritance
taxation is eliminated now, the aggregate eﬃciency losses rise due to the increased tax
distortions.
Of course, the (negative) insurance eﬀects of the reform are eliminated if we simulate
the reform with risk neutral agents. Consequently, aggregate eﬃciency rises signiﬁcantly
in the right part of Table 6. With the same reasoning, aggregate eﬃciency decreases, if
15Table 6: Aggregate eﬃciency eﬀects: Sensitivity analysis
γ 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.25
η 4.0 4.0 0.0 0.0
ΓΓ p Γu Γu Γu
τb =0 .17 -0.05 0.22 1.14 0.98
τb =0 .00 -0.46 0.37 1.04 0.78
we simulate the reform now without inheritance taxation. Finally, a lower intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution will also slightly dampen the reduction in tax distortions.
Consequently, aggregate eﬃciency in the last column is lower than in the previous one.
4.3 Policy reforms with endogenous debt
Due to the variation of the endogenous consumption tax rate, the benchmark reform of the
previous section induced a signiﬁcant intergenerational redistribution. In order to dampen
the latter, this subsection considers an alternative reform strategy which implements a
constant consumption tax rate to balance the intertemporal budget constraint of the
government. Periodical shortfalls or surpluses of tax revenues are balanced by adjustments
of public debt.
In the ﬁrst simulation introduces tax-favored accounts as in the previous subsection. This
form of retirement saving taxation is also called front-loaded. Since the exemption of
savings returns from tax is only one form of expenditure taxation, the second simulation
introduces back-loaded IRAs where contributions are not tax deductible but withdrawals
are tax free. Since we abstract from any restrictions on contributions and withdrawals,
back-loaded IRAs are identical to a preannounced elimination of interest taxation (i.e.
ds = ∞ in equation (6)). Table 7 compares the long run impact of the two considered
reforms and the respective eﬃciency consequences.
With front-loaded IRAs, the consumption tax rate has to be increased immediately by
2.6 percentage points right after the reform. Since this does not suﬃce to balance the
revenue shortfalls, the government accumulates public debt which rises (from 60 per cent
of GDP initially) up to 146 percent of GDP. As before, tax-favored accounts reduce the
tax burden of middle-aged and elderly. Consequently, they save more and transfer more
to their descendants. However, due to the increase in public debt capital accumulation is
much weaker than before. Of course, the latter dampens the long run growth in consump-
tion, output and wages. Note that the aggregate eﬃciency gains are now higher than in
16Table 7: Long-run eﬀects of debt-ﬁnanced IRAs∗
Benchmark Debt-ﬁnanced IRAs
reform Front-loaded Back-loaded
Capital stock 21.9 9.9 6.0
Aggegate Savings 21.9 32.3 5.2
Aggregate IRA sharea 96 92 100
Employment 0.5 0.1 0.5
Consumption 3.9 1.8 1.6
GDP 6.5 2.9 2.1
Wage 6.0 2.8 1.6
Interest rate p.a.b -0.9 -0.5 -0.3
Bequest 12.2 31.4 5.6
Consumption taxb -1.1 2.6 1.1
Eﬃciency gainsc 0.22 0.34 0.13
∗Changes are reported in percentage over initial equilibrium.
aIn percent of aggregate assets. bChanges in percentage points.
cIn percent of remaining resources.
the benchmark since intertemporal distortions from the ﬂuctuating consumption tax are
eliminated.
In contrast, a preannounced elimination of capital income taxation would increase the
consumption tax rate only by 1.1 percentage point throughout the transition. Since
individuals can’t reduce their tax burdens on labor income with higher savings10,t h e
capital accumulation is weaker than before. On the other hand, back-loaded IRAs allow
to reduce public debt in the long run slightly to 59.5 percent of GDP. Consequently,
aggegate savings increase less than the capital stock. Finally, due to the still high marginal
tax burdens on labor income aggregate eﬃciency gains are dampened compared to the
previous simulation.
Figure 2 compares the intergenerational welfare consequences of the two reform strategies
with the benchmark case. Note ﬁrst that now the losses of the elderly are much smaller
than before. In the case of debt-ﬁnanced front-loaded IRAs, pension beneﬁts increase
initially due to higher labor supply. Consequently, higher consumption taxes now reduce
mainly the welfare of young retirees by about 0.5 percent of their resources. Younger
generations beneﬁt from higher inheritances, wages and better tax arbitrage opportunities.
The introduction of debt-ﬁnanced back-loaded IRAs reduces the welfare of elderly only
10Of course, if we would allow them to accumulate individual debt, progressive income taxes would not
necessarily increase savings, see Ragan (1994).
17slightly since they beneﬁt directly from the elimination of capital income taxes. The
latter almost balances the loss from the increased consumption tax rate. Young and
future generations beneﬁt again due to higher wages.
Figure 2: Welfare eﬀects of tax-favored accounts (debt-ﬁnancing)
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Since both reforms considered above eliminate the taxation of capital income with a
constant consumption tax rate, the literature often highlights the equivalence of these
two forms of expenditure taxation, see Meade (1978, 153). In the present model, the
diﬀerence between front-loaded and back-loaded IRAs in terms of their macroeconomic
and welfare consequences is mainly due to the progressive income tax system and the
diﬀerences in the timing and the pattern of tax payments. If we assume a proportional
income tax, a small open economy and phase-in the introduction of both reforms (i.e.
only the young in each period are allowed to open an IRA) we obtain the equivalence
result cited in the literature. However, in practice, back-loaded and front-loaded IRAs
are not equivalent due to these restrictions.
Summing up this subsection we conclude that a deﬁcit-ﬁnanced introduction of front-
loaded IRAs would only modestly hurt currently living generations and increase the
growth and eﬃciency gains compared to the benchmark simulation. However, since the
debt level rises enormously, such a reform is not viable in practice. Consequently, in the
following subsection we return to the constant debt assumption of the benchmark and
consider more realistic institutional arrangements which limit revenue shortfalls and the
intergenerational redistribution.
184.4 Penalties, contribution ceilings and bonus payments
As already explained above, the withdrawal from the accounts is usually restricted in
various ways. For example in Germany, savers have to pay back their tax savings on
balances which are withdrawn before age 60 and have to convert their assets into annuities
after retirement. Other countries such as the US apply an early withdrawal penalty which
severely lowers the liquidity of the tax-favored accounts. In addition, in order to limit
revenue shortfalls, countries allow tax deduction only up to a speciﬁc contribution ceiling.
Finally, some special special arrangements such as bonus payments in Germany might be
provided for low income households. In the following simulations we always assume the
most extreme case, where early withdrawal is not possible at all (i.e. φ =1 .0). Table 8
then compares saving incentives in the form of unlimited or limited tax deductions with
other systems were direct bonus payments are applied.
The ﬁrst simulation only introduces withdrawal restrictions but keeps the benchmark val-
ues for the remaining parameters. When the liquidity of the tax-favored accounts during
the working phase is eliminated, people will save less in these accounts. Consequently,
compared to the benchmark case in Table 5 the capital accumulation is now dampened,
and the IRA share is signiﬁcantly lower. On the other hand, employment and wages
still rise by 0.8 and 4.5 percent, respectively, in the long run and the consumption tax
rate increases initially by 7.8 percentage points. Due to the reduced initial increase of
the consumption tax rate, the intergenerational redistribution is dampened. The oldest
generations now lose less then 4 percent of their remaining lifetime resources and the
future generations gain less than 2 percent. On the other hand, aggregate eﬃciency gains
increase slightly from 0.22 to 0.30 percent. Of course, liquidity restrictions reduce the
eﬃciency of the resource allocation. However, they also restrict the shift from the pro-
gressive income tax to the consumption tax. The latter improves the insurance properties
of the tax system and, consequently, aggregate eﬃciency rises11.
Next we consider the introduction of contribution limits. The ceiling of 2100 e in Ger-
many amounts to roughly 8 percent of average gross earnings. Contribution limits signiﬁ-
cantly reduce the tax arbitrage opportunities for rich households. Their marginal tax rate
for labor income either remains constant (if they are in the top tax bracket) or declines
only slightly compared to the previous simulation. In addition, if they save more than
the contribution ceiling, their eﬀective marginal tax rate on savings is not aﬀected by the
reform. Consequently, the long-run IRA savings only amount to 40 percent of aggregate
11If we introduce withdrawal restrictions when individuals are risk neutral, aggregate eﬃciency de-
creases signiﬁcantly.
19Table 8: Tax-favored accounts with withdrawal restrictions (φ =1 .0)∗
Tax deductions Bonus payments Mixed
(κ = ∞)( ˆ s =0 .0) κ =0 .04
Variable ˆ s = ∞ ˆ s =0 .08 ¯ w ˆ s =0 .16 ¯ wκ =0 .04 κ =0 .08 ˆ s =0 .08 ¯ w
Capital stock
2010-15 4.6 1.0 1.5 0.6 0.6 1.0
2015-19 7.9 1.8 2.9 1.2 1.1 1.9
2025-29 12.5 3.2 5.4 2.2 2.1 3.4
∞ 16.7 5.6 9.6 4.1 3.5 6.2
IRA sharea
2010-15 27 8 11 7 8 8
2015-19 44 15 22 14 15 16
2025-29 63 27 38 25 26 28
∞ 70 40 53 36 35 42
Employment
2005-09 1.8 0.3 0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.0
2015-19 1.0 0.2 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.0
2025-29 1.0 0.2 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.0
∞ 0.8 0.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
Wages
2005-09 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
2015-19 2.0 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.6
2025-29 3.3 0.9 1.5 0.7 0.7 1.0
∞ 4.5 1.6 2.7 1.3 1.1 1.9
Consumption taxb
2005-09 7.8 1.8 2.8 1.6 1.4 2.2
2015-19 3.3 1.4 2.3 1.3 1.0 1.8
2025-29 0.7 1.0 1.5 0.9 0.6 1.4
∞ -0.7 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.1
Eﬃciencyc 0.30 -0.09 -0.11 0.03 0.12 -0.01
∗Changes are reported in percentage over initial equilibrium. aIn percent of aggregate assets.
bIn percentage points. cIn percent of initial resources.
savings and the capital stock increases by 5.6 percent12. The consumption tax has to be
increased by 1.8 percentage points initially and falls in the long run slightly below the
original level. Since marginal income tax rates hardly change for many rich households
but consumption taxes increase initially, eﬃciency gains fall signiﬁcantly compared to
the previous simulation. The considered reform now yields an aggregate eﬃciency loss of
about 0.1 percent of aggregate resources.
A doubling of the contribution limit has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on capital accumulation and
12Note that ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, et al. (1998, 759) ﬁnd a similar modest long-run increase in the capital stock.
20GDP. Aggregate eﬃciency, however, is hardly aﬀected since (positive) tax incentive and
(negative) insurance eﬀects balance on aggregate.
While contribution ceilings mainly aﬀect the saving decision of wealthy individuals, bonus
payments are an attractive incentive for low income households. In Germany, the age-
dependent bonus scheme roughly amounts to the tax savings of an average income house-
hold if he contributes 4 percent of his income to the tax-favored account. As reported
in the forth column of Table 8, with our speciﬁc calibration bonus payments are cheaper
in terms of forgone tax revenues than contribution limits but also induce lower growth
eﬀects for capital stock and employment. Aggregate eﬃciency gains are slightly positive,
since bonus payments can be viewed as an insurance device for low income households.
Increasing the required contribution for full bonuses from 4 to 8 percent of individual
income reduces the incentive to accumulate capital. This in turn leads to a lower con-
sumption taxes during transition. The IRA share, on the other hand, is hardly aﬀected
since households shift resources from their ordinary savings accounts into tax-favored ac-
counts. Nevertheless, aggregate eﬃciency slightly increases to 0.12 percent of aggregate
resources due to lower consumption taxes.
Finally, we simulate a mixed incentive system which resembles the German setting de-
scribed above. Depending on the individual advantage of the respective subsidy, house-
holds either receive bonus payments or tax deductions up to the contribution ceiling.
Since this mixture combines saving incentives both for low and top income households,
the induced growth eﬀects for the capital stock are higher than in the respective reforms
were either limited tax deductions or bonus payments are applied. Aggregate eﬃciency
is almost zero in this case.
Next we consider in Figure 3 the intergenerational welfare consequences of tax deductions
with contribution limits (ˆ s =0 .08 ¯ w) and bonus payments (κ =0 .04). Compared to the
benchmark in Figure 1, the intergenerational redistribution in now very modest. The
oldest generations lose roughly one percent of their remaining resources, while future
generations gain less than one percent. Due to the strongest initial consumption tax
increase, the mixed reform reduces welfare of elderly the most. Since employment rises
in the case of contribution ceilings while it falls with bonus payments, pensions increase
slightly in the former case while they fall in the latter. Consequently, elderly are slightly
better of with contribution ceilings than with bonus payments. In the long run, the
mixed system generates the strongest wage growth so that future generations are better
oﬀ compared to the two other scenarios.
In order to shed more light on the diﬀerence between tax deductions and bonus payments,
we compare in Figure 4 the welfare consequences for diﬀerent productivity types of the
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generation that enters the labor market in the reform period (i.e. year of birth 1985 in
Figure 3). As one would expect, low productivity individuals beneﬁt much stronger from
bonus payments than from tax deductions. For top productivity households the diﬀerence
is negligible, due to the risk of becoming a low productivity type in the future.
Figure 4: Short-run welfare eﬀects (tax deductions vs. bonuses)
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In the long run, the relative advantage of the diﬀerent subsidy instrument changes. As
Figure 5 shows, now the mixed system is better for low productivity types due to the
higher wages.
Concluding this subsection our simulations therefore indicate that although bonus pay-
ments are an eﬃcient means for low income households even the latter would opt for a
mixed system in the long run.
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5 Conclusion
The present paper develops a general equilibrium model with idiosyncratic labor income
risk in order to analyze the introduction of tax-favored individual retirement accounts.
We ﬁnd that the currently implemented reforms will have a signiﬁcant impact on capital
accumulation in the long run, but only yield very minor aggregate eﬃciency gains. The
main beneﬁciaries are future generations while current middle-aged and elderly are hurt
by the reform. The latter is due to the fact that existing cohorts mainly have to bear the
burden from higher consumption taxes while young and future generations beneﬁt from
lower tax burdens and higher future wages.
We also show that withdrawal penalties only have a minor impact on the macroeconomy.
While tax deductions are mainly beneﬁcial for top income households, low income house-
holds can be eﬀectively subsidized with direct bonus payments. In the long run, however,
even low income households prefer a mixture of direct bonuses and tax deductions since
the latter increases wages stronger.
Of course, the present framework could be extended in various other directions. In fu-
ture work we plan to extend our model in order to analyze the eﬃciency of additional
subsidy instruments for retirement savings, mandatory savings accounts and the required
annuitization of retirement income.
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The state of a household is determined by zj =( j,epj,a R
j ,a j,e j) ∈J×P×A R ×A×E
where J = {1,...,J},P = {ep1,...,ep nP},AR = {aR,1,...,a R,nR},A = {a1,...,a nA}
and E = {e1,...,e nE} are discrete sets. In this paper we use nJ =1 6 ,n p =5 ,n R =
12,n A =1 2a n dnE = 6. For all these possible states zj we compute the optimal decision
of households from (1).
Since u(cj,  j) is not diﬀerentiable in every (cj,  j)a n dV (zj+1) is only known in a discrete
set of points zj+1 ∈{ j +1 }×P×A R ×A×E, this maximization problem can not be
solved analytically. Therefore we have to use the following numerical maximization and
interpolation algorithms to compute households optimal decision:
1. Compute (1) in age J for all possible zJ.N o t i c et h a tV (zJ+1) = 0 and households are
not allowed to work anymore. Hence, in the optimum households should consume
everything they have.
2. For j = J − 1,...,1:
24Find (1) for all possible zj by using Powell’s algorithm (Press et. al. (2001, 406ﬀ.),
Acton (1990, 464ﬀ.)). Since this algorithm requires a continuous function, we have
to interpolate V (zj+1). Having computed the data V (zj+1) for all zj+1 ∈{ j +
1}×P×A R ×A×Ein the last step, we can now ﬁnd functions sp(j+1),k for each






















for all l =1 ,...,n P ,m=1 ,...,n R and n =1 ,...,n A. In this paper we use
multidimensional cubic spline interpolation, i.e. sj,k : S3 ×S 3 ×S 3 → R,w h e r e a s
S3 is the space of all one-dimensional, twice continuously diﬀerentiable, piecewise
third-order polynomial functions and S3 ×S 3 ×S 3 its tensor product (cf. Judd
(1998, 225ﬀ.)). Further information is available upon request, see Habermann and
Kindermann (2006). The multidimensional cubic spline interpolation allows a re-
duction of nP,n R and nA to only a few points with the same accuracy as multilinear
interpolation.
Having computed the data V (zj) for all zj we can now approach like ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu et. al.
(1995).
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